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Contracting with Externalities and Outside Options 
 
Summary 
This paper proposes a model of multilateral contracting where players are engaged in 
two parallel interactions: they dynamically form coalitions and play a repeated normal 
form game with temporary and permanent decisions. This formulation encompasses 
many economic models with externalities and outside options. We show that when 
outside options are pure (i.e. independent of the actions of other players), there exists a 
Markov Perfect equilibrium resulting in efficient outcomes when players become 
perfectly patient. If outside options are not pure, all Markov perfect equilibria may be 
inefficient. The distribution of coalitional gains and the dynamics of coalition formation 
are characterized in four illustrative applications. 
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Multilateral contracting often involves strategic negotiations. The recent
examples of the Kyoto protocol to reduce the emission of greenhouse gases,
and of the Doha round to eliminate tari¤s in international trade show that
countries adopt a number of strategies (such as forming groups, delaying
decisions, leaving the negotiations table) to a¤ect the outcome of negoti-
ations. Given the importance of the decisions taken through multilateral
negotiations, it is a worthwhile task for economists to try and understand
what leads parties to sometimes reach ine¢cient, partial contracts instead
of forming global agreements.
In order to model multilateral negotiations, we resort to an extension
of Rubinstein (1982)’s bargaining model to more than two players (see dis-
cussion of literature below), in which we allow for coalition formation and
s t r a t e g i ca c t i o nc h o i c e s .W ec o n s t r u c tam o d e lw h e r ep l a y e r sa r ee n g a g e di n
two parallel interactions: they propose to form coalitions in order to extract
gains from cooperation; and coalitions participate in a repeated normal form
game, where they choose actions that may either be temporary or permanent
(exiting or opting out). The model thus encompasses a wide variety of situ-
ations involving externalities and endogenous exit decisions. We argue that
the combination of strategic action choices and coalition formation is not
merely a technical nicety but also provides novel insights into multilateral
contracting that have economic applications.
Our analysis centers around three questions: When is the outcome of
multilateral contracting e¢cient? Are coalitions formed immediately or
gradually? What is the distribution of gains from cooperation in the equi-
librium contract? We provide an answer to the …rst question in the most
general context. We address the dynamics of coalition formation and the
distribution of gains from cooperation in selected illustrative applications.
In classical models of two player bargaining, when a player chooses her
outside option, negotiations end and the other player is left with a …xed pay-
o¤. In the context of multilateral negotiations, when a player opts out and
1chooses to enforce a permanent action, the other players continue to bargain
over the formation of coalitions and continue to choose actions which may
a¤ect the payo¤ of the exiting player. We point out that there is a crucial
distinction between situations where outside option values are independent
o ft h ea c t i o no fo t h e rp l a y e r s( ac a s ew el a b e lpure outside options)a n d
situations where players’ outside option values are a¤ected by the actions of
remaining players.
The key result of our paper is that there always exist an e¢cient equi-
librium outcome in games with pure outside options. To understand this
result, notice …rst that, because players make simultaneous action choices,
coordination failures may arise, and we cannot rule out ine¢cient equilibria
where all players simultaneously exit. In order to select equilibria which are
immune to coordination failures, we introduce a re…nement of equilibrium
in which at every choice of actions, players remain in the game with a prob-
ability greater than ">0: In games with pure outside options, we show that
as players become perfectly patient, equilibria without coordination failure
exist and are e¢cient– the probability of exit converges to zero, and all play-
ers eventually reach an e¢cient global contract. The intuition underlying
these results is easily grasped. Early exit results in an aggregate e¢ciency
loss. In a game with pure outside options, players are able to capture this
ine¢ciency loss and will never choose to leave before the grand coalition is
formed. By staying in the game one more period, a player is guaranteed to
obtain her outside option (which remains available because outside options
are pure), and is able to capture the ine¢ciency loss by proposing to form
the grand coalition when she is recognized to make an o¤er. Hence, early
exit will never occur in equilibrium.
The previous result depends crucially on the fact that outside options
are independent of the actions of the other players. We provide an example
to show that, in games where outside options are not pure, all equilibrium
outcomes may lead to the ine¢cient formation of partial coalitions. The
three-player example we construct displays the following features: (i) once
a two-player coalition has formed, players obtain a large payo¤ when they
2are the only ones exiting the game, and the unique equilibrium of the si-
multaneous action game is completely mixed, so that exit occurs with a
positive probability, and (ii) at the initial stage where all players are single-
tons, players have an incentive to form a two-player coalition, as a partial
agreement results in a large asymmetry between the two-player coalition
and the remaining singleton. When both features are present (incentives to
exit alone and large payo¤ to partial agreements), in all equilibria, players
initially choose to form a two-player coalition, and to exit the game with
a positive probability. These equilibria are obviously ine¢cient, as players
exit before extracting all gains from cooperation.
In order to analyze in more detail the equilibria of the game, we con-
sider four illustrative applications of the model. The …rst two applications
deal with games with pure outside options, which as we already know admit
e¢cient equilibria when there are no coordination failures. We focus our
attention on the distribution of gains and the dynamics of contracting. The
…rst application is an extension of two-player games with outside options
to a multilateral context. We show that the equilibrium (without coordina-
tion failures) of the multilateral game re‡ects the “outside option principle”:
either outside options are binding and the player with the largest outside
option receives her outside option, or they are not binding and the outcome
of bargaining is una¤ected by outside options. However, when outside op-
tions are binding, the equilibrium exhibits a novel property: the equilibrium
p a y o ¤o fa l lp l a y e r sd e p e n do nt h eentire vector of outside options (and is
an increasing function of players’ own outside options). The main reason
for the surprising result is that the player with the largest outside option
randomizes between exiting and staying after a rejection, so that even val-
ues of small outside options matter because they can credibly occur o¤ the
equilibrium path.
In our second application, we analyze the principal-agent models with
externalities proposed by Segal (1999), where a single principal contracts
with several agents, and the contract imposes externalities on non-trading
agents. We focus on the dynamics of coalition formation in a model with
3symmetric agents, and show that when trading between the principal and
agents induces positive externalities on other agents, the principal and agents
contracts to form the grand coalition in one step. When trading induces neg-
ative externalities, the grand coalition is formed in two steps. The principal
…rst chooses to contract with a subset of agents in order to reduce the outside
opportunities of the remaining agents.
The last two applications consider games where the payo¤ of exiting play-
ers depends on the actions chosen by remaining players. We …rst consider
a three-player pure public good game, similar to the game studied by Ray
and Vohra (2001). Countries negotiate over the reduction of pollution levels,
and partial contracts result in positive externalities on the other countries.
We show that the grand coalition does form in equilibrium. Depending on
the value of partial agreements, a global agreement is either reached imme-
diately or in two steps. Finally, we discuss a model of market entry with
synergies, where …rms may merge –and bene…t from synergies – before en-
tering the market. In this model, the merger of two …rms induces negative
externalities on the remaining …rms. Assuming that the market can only
support one …rm, we exhibit a range of parameter values for which the game
results in the ine¢cient formation of a partial agreement.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
model and Section 3 contains preliminary results on characterization and
existence of equilibria. In Section 4, we discuss e¢ciency of the bargaining
outcomes, and establish our main results. Section 5 discusses our four illus-
trative applications, and Section 6 concludes. We start with a review of the
existing literature on coalition formation.
Literature Review
The model we propose belongs to a family of extensive form games ex-
tending Rubinstein (1982)’s model to more than two players. In order to
situate our contribution with respect to the existing literature, we summarize
in the table below earlier work on related models of coalitional bargaining.1
1W ed i dn o ti n c l u d ei nt h et a b l em o d e l sw h e r em u l t i p l eo ¤ e r sc a nb em a d ea ta n yp o i n t
4immediate exit continuous renegotiations endogenous exit
no externalities
…xed order Chatterjee et al. (1993) Seidmann Winter (SW)(1998) SW(1998)
random order Okada (1996) Gul (1989)
externalities
…xed order Bloch (1996) Ray Vohra (1999)
random order Montero (1999) Gomes (2001) THIS PAPER
In the …rst column, we list models where coalitions are forced to exit after
they form. It is well-known that this assumption may result in ine¢cient
o u t c o m e s ,e v e ni nt h ea b s e n c eo fe x t e r n a l i t i e s . 2 Clearly, this ine¢ciency is
still present in the larger class of games with externalities.
By contrast, the second column lists models where players never leave
the game, and extract a ‡ow payo¤ every period. In these games with con-
tinuous renegotiations, the grand coalition is ultimately formed, as players
will continue negotiating until all gains from cooperation are exhausted. Sei-
dmann and Winter (1998) focus their attention on conditions under which
the grand coalition is formed immediately or gradually; Gomes (2001) shows
that delays in the formation of the grand coalition arise in games with nega-
tive externalities, and that the grand coalition forms immediately in games
with positive externalities..
To the best of our knowledge, the only precursor to our study, allowing
coalitions to endogenously choose when to exit, is one of the models pro-
posed by Seidmann and Winter (1998). Our model di¤ers from theirs in
various aspects. First, they consider a …xed order whereas we allow for ran-
dom choice in the identity of the proposer. Second, and more importantly,
in time. Perry and Reny (1994) and Maskin (2003) propose models where coalitions can
bid for new members by making simultaneous o¤ers. We also did not include models based
on e¤ectivity functions such as Gomes and Jehiel (2002) and Konishi and Ray (2003).
2Consider the following example, inspired by Chatterjee et al. (1993). Let n =3and
the gains from cooperation be represented by a coalitional function v(S)=0if jSj =1 ,
v(S)=3if jSj =2and v(S)=4when jSj =3 : As ± converges to 1, the outcome of
the bargaining procedure where the grand coalition forms should result in equal sharing
of the coalitional surplus among the symmetric players (
4
3 for every player). But clearly,
players then have an incentive to deviate forming an ine¢cient coalition of size 2, inducing
ap a y o ¤o f
3
2 for each coalitional member. If this coalition must leave the negotiation after
its formation, the additional surplus of 1 is lost.
5the underlying gains from cooperation in their model are represented by a
coalitional function (with no externalities), whereas payo¤s in our model
are based on strategic interaction at the action phase. These di¤erences
preclude a direct comparison of our results, and in particular the distinc-
tion between games with pure outside options or general outside options is
irrelevant in the context of Seidmann and Winter (1998).
2T h e M o d e l
We model the formation of coalitions and bargaining as an in…nite horizon
game, with two distinct phases at every period. Any period starts with a
contracting phase, where a player is chosen at random to propose a coalition,
and a payment to all other coalition members. All prospective members
r e s po n di nt u r nt ot h eo ¤ e r ,a n dt h ec o a l i t i o ni sf o r m e do n l yi fa l li t sm e m be r s
agree to the contract. If a coalition is formed, the proposer acquires control
rights over the resources of coalition members. We then identify the player
with the coalition formed. In the action phase, all active players choose an
action, which may be a permanent action (in which case the player exits the
game) or a temporary action. The action pro…le determines a ‡ow payo¤ for
all the players, representing the underlying economic opportunities.3 The
interplay between the contracting and action phases enables us to consider
simultaneously issues of coalition formation, externalities and endogenous
exit decisions.
Formally, let N be a set of agents, indexed by i =1 ;2;::;n.Ac o a l i t i o n
S is a non-empty subset of agents, and a coalition structure is a partition of
the set N into disjoint coalitions, fS1;::;S j;::;SJg: Time is discrete and runs
as t =1 ;2;:::;1 and every period t is decomposed into two subperiods: a
contracting phase and an action phase. Subgames are described by a state
variable s composed of the set of active players, the set of players that have
3This contrasts with all other models of coalitional bargaining, where underlying ben-
e…ts from cooperation are either represented by games in coalitional function form (Chat-
terjee et al. (1993), Seidmann and Winter (1998)) or by games in partition function form
(Ray and Vohra (1999), Gomes (2001)).
6exited, and their exit decisions.
Contracting phase: Let N(s) be the set of active players at state s.O n e
of the players in N(s) is chosen at random to make an o¤er. The probability
with which player S is chosen to make an o¤er, qS(s); is exogenously given
and may depend on the state. An o¤er is a pair c =( S;t), where S is a
subset of players in N(s) and t av e c t o ro ft r a n s f e r ss a t i s f y i n g
P
S2S tS =0 :
We interpret the transfer tT as the net present value of a ‡ow of payments,
by which player S obtains control over the resources of player T.W h e n
player S has obtained control over the resources of all the players in S,
we identify the player with the coalition.4 A …xed protocol determines the
o r d e ri nw h i c hp l a y e r si nSnS respond to the o¤er c. If all of them accept
the o¤er, the coalition is formed, and a new state is obtained, with a set of
active players (N(s)nS)[f[ T2STg: If one of the prospective members of S
rejects the o¤er, no trade takes place and the state stays at s.
Action phase: At the action phase in state s,a l la c t i v ep l a y e r si nN(s)
simultaneously choose an action. As noted above, a player in N(s) may
have acquired control over the resources of a coalition S. In that case, her
action set is given by a set AS which may be di¤erent from AS = £j2SAj.5
The action set AS is decomposed into a set of permanent (or exit) actions
ES a n das e to ft e m p o r a r y( o rreversible) actions RS. In many applications,
the two sets only consist of one element: a single action r 2 RS interpreted
as “remaining in the game”, and a single action, e 2 ES, interpreted as
“exiting the game”. By choosing a permanent action eS 2 ES,ap l a y e r
simultaneously commits to play the same action ad in…nitum and to leave
the negotiations (the set of players who have exited at state s is denoted by
E(s)). Hence, we interpret a permanent action as an irreversible investment
made by the player, which is not subject to renegotiation.
4As active players are identi…ed with the coalitions they control, we do not keep track
of the identity of the agents who control coalitions.
5In some applications, it may be natural to suppose that a player who has acquired
a coalition S has access to an action set AS = £i2SAi. This is only one of the possible
interpretations of our model, and we prefer to de…ne generally action sets for all the
coalitions.
7At the end of the action phase, ‡ow payo¤s are collected by all the play-
ers. If the action pro…le is a =( rT;T2N(s) ;eT;T2E(s)) ‡ow payo¤s accrue to
all players in N(s) [E(s) according to utility functions vS(a).T h e p a y o ¤
‡ow (or single-period payo¤) is (1 ¡ ±)vS(a) with present value vS(a); where
± 2 (0;1) is the common discount rate of all players. Note that the payo¤
functions vS(a) are de…ned, for every coalition S and every coalition struc-
ture containing S, and the actions taken by all coalitions in the coalition
structure.6 When the grand coalition forms, we let V denote the total payo¤




vS(a) for any state s a n da c t i o np r o … l ea:
Formally, a state of the game s is described by three elements: the
active players in the game, N(s); the set of players who have exited, E(s),
and the permanent actions they have chosen;e (s)=( eT;T2E(s)).W er e s t r i c t
o u ra t t e n t i o nt oMarkovian strategies. Hence, at the contracting phase,
a proposer’s strategy only depends on the current state s,ar e s p o n d e n t ’ s
strategy only depends on the current state s and the current o¤er she receives
tT: At the action phase, strategies only depend on the current state s.A
Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) is a Markovian strategy pro…le, where
every player acts optimally at every contracting phase of the game, and all
players play a Nash equilibrium at every action phase.
F o rag i v e nM a r k o v i a ns t r a t e g y ,l e tÁ1
S(s) denote the continuation value
of the game for player S at the contracting phase at state s (before the
choice of proposer), and Á2
S(s) denote the continuation value of player S at
the action phase of state s. Finally, we denote by ©i the value of the game
for player i at the initial contracting stage, when no coalition has formed.
6Again, we note that in some applications, it is natural to assume vS(a)=
P
i2S vi(a),
but this only one of the possible interpretations of our model.
83 Characterization and Existence
We now provide a complete characterization of equilibrium. At any state s,
we …rst compute the mixed strategy equilibria at the action phase, taking
continuation values Á1
S(:) as given.
The action stage at state s can be represented by a standard game in
strategic form, ¡(s)=( N(s);fAS;u S(s;¢)gS2N(s)), where players are the
active players at state s, AS the action set of player S and payo¤s uS(s;¢)
are de…ned as follows. For any action pro…le a; let P(a) be the set of active
players who have chosen permanent (exit) actions, and e denote those per-
manent actions. De…ne h(s;a) to be the new state reached after the choice
of actions a,i . e .h(s;a)=fN(s)nP(a);E(s)[P(a);(e(s);e)g: In words, the
state h(s;a) is the state reached from state s, when players in P(a) have
chosen the permanent actions e. The payo¤ function uS(s;¢) corresponds to
the continuation value of the game at the action phase. Players receive a
‡ow payo¤ of (1 ¡ ±)vS(a;e(s)) in the current period, and the game moves
to the contracting phase of state h(s;a) in the next period, so that
uS(s;a)=±Á1
S(h(s;a)) + (1 ¡ ±)vS(a;e(s)):
In a Markov perfect equilibrium, the strategy pro…le ¾2 (s) of active players
at the action phase of state s must be a Nash equilibrium of game ¡(s).
We now suppose that the continuation values at the action phases Á2
S(:)
are …xed, and compute the optimal behavior of proposers and respondents
at the contracting stage of state s.I f a n y p l a y e r T rejects the contract
o¤ered, the game moves to the action phase of state s and player T re-
ceives a payo¤ Á2
T(s): The minimal o¤er that player T accepts is Á2
T(s),
and thus any proposer optimally o¤ers tT = Á2
T(s): Given a contract c =
(S;t), de…ne the state obtained when the o¤er is accepted at state s by
g(c;s)=f(N(s)nS) [f [ T2STg;E(s);e(s)g– i.e. all coalitions belonging to
S cease to exist and a new larger coalition, [T2ST; is formed. If player
S proposes a contract c and the contract is accepted, the game moves to





T(s): The proposer thus selects the coalition









If di¤erent coalitions result in the same maximal payo¤, player S may ran-
domize across the coalitions formed, and we let ¾1 (s) denote the probability
distribution over all subsets S½N (s);S2Sthat player S may form at state
s. We have now completely characterized the Markov perfect equilibrium




Lemma 1 As t r a t e g yp r o … l e¾ is a Markov perfect equilibrium if and only
if there exists payo¤s Á1
S (s);Á 2
S (s) such that:
(i) at the action stage, ¾2 (s) i saN a s he q u i l i b r i u mo ft h eg a m e¡(s)=
(N(s);fAS;u S(s)gS2N(s)) where uS(s;a)=±Á1
S(h(s;a))+(1¡±)vS(a;e(s)),
and Á2
S(s) is the equilibrium payo¤ of coalition S at this equilibrium;
(ii) at the contracting stage, for all contracts c =( S;t) in the support of
¾1 (s):
tT = Á2




























T (s)(T )(1S2T Á2
S(s)+1S= 2T Á2
S(g(c;s)))
where qS(s) is the probability that coalition S makes an o¤er at state s and
1 is the indicator function.
The Lemma gives a complete characterization of equilibrium, and enables
us to compute the continuation values of the game at the contracting and
10action stages. At the action stage, the continuation value is obtained as
the equilibrium payo¤ of a strategic game played by the active players. At
the contracting stage, the continuation value is obtained as an expected
value, considering three possible situations. With probability qS(s),p l a y e r
S is called to make an o¤er, and proposes to form any optimal coalition S,




T(s)): With probability qT(s),
another player T is recognized to make an o¤er, and proposes a coalition
T : Either player S belongs to coalition T ,a n dr e c e i v e st h eo ¤ e rÁ2
S(s),o r
player S does not belong to the coalition, and receives her continuation value
Á2
S(g(c;s)) at the action phase of state:
We now prove the existence of continuation values Á1
S(s) and Á2
S(s) sat-
isfying the conditions of the above Lemma, and show that the coalitional
bargaining game always has a Markov perfect equilibrium.
Proposition 1 The coalitional bargaining game admits a Markov perfect
equilibrium.
The characterization results of this section will be used to construct
Markov perfect equilibria in the examples and applications of the next sec-
tions.
4E ¢ c i e n c y
We start the e¢ciency analysis of coalitional bargaining game by consider-
ing games with pure outside options, where a player’s payo¤ after exit is
independent of the actions of the other players. Formally:
De…nition 1 T h eu n d e r l y i n gg a m ev is a game with pure outside options




The condition above clearly applies to the games without externalities
studied by Seidmann and Winter (1999). But it also applies to games with
externalities like the principal agent problems considered by Segal (1999).
11Moreover, the condition does not rule out the possibility that players’ actions
a¤ect the interim payo¤s of other players, which may have an important
in‡uence on the coalitions ultimately formed and the distribution of gains
from cooperation.
We show that games with pure outside options always admit Markov
perfect equilibria where contracting results in an approximately Pareto ef-
…cient outcome. Formally, we show that for any »>0;
P
©i >V¡ » for
all ± ¸ ±(»), where we recall that ©i is player i value at the beginning of
the game. We also show that when externalities on players’ exit payo¤s
are negligible, the coalitional bargaining procedure results in approximately
e¢cient contracting outcomes.
Conversely, in games where players’ outside options depend on the be-
havior of other players, all Markov perfect equilibria may be ine¢cient (i.e.,
there exists a »>0 such that
P
©i <V¡ » in all equilibria and for all
± ¸ ±(»)): We exhibit a three-player game where, in all equilibria, there ex-
ists an action stage where the probability of players exiting is bounded away
from zero and, at the initial contracting stage, players have an incentive to
reach the action stage where exit occurs with positive probability.
E¢ciency in Games with Pure Outside Options
Ine¢cient outcomes arise in the bargaining game when players exit be-
fore the formation of the grand coalition.7 At the action phase, as players’
exit choices are simultaneous, coordination failures may lead to ine¢cient
equilibria. Consider the following simple two-player example.
Example 1 There are two symmetric players. Each player has access to





and the total value of the coalition f12g is
V> 2a
7As we consider situations where players’ discount factors converge to 1,i n e ¢ c i e n c i e s
due to delay in the formation of the grand coalition become negligible.
12Let Á1 denote the common continuation value (at a symmetric equilib-
rium) of both players at the initial state. In the action phase, the game ¡
played by the two players has a payo¤ matrix given by:
re
r (±Á1;±Á 1) (±a;a)
e (a;±a) (a;a)
It is easy to see that this game admits an ine¢cient pure strategy equi-
librium where both players simultaneously exit. Notice that this is not the
only equilibrium of the game for high values of the discount factor ±.I f
±>2a=V , the game also admits an e¢cient symmetric pure strategic equi-
librium where both players remain, and Á1 = V=2.
Example 1 illustrates in the simplest way the fact that coordination
failures are unavoidable in a model where exit decisions are simultaneous.
However, when the discount factor ± is high enough, the game also admits
e¢cient equilibria where both players remain in the game with positive
probability. Coordination failures at the action phase can easily result in
ine¢cient equilibria at the contracting phase as well.8
Hence, in our search for e¢cient outcomes, we focus on equilibria without
coordination failures at the action phase. We de…ne an "-R strategy pro…le
as one where all players put a probability at least equal to " of remaining in
the game at every action stage. Formally, we de…ne:
De…nition 2 For any " 2 (0;1); an "-R strategy pro…le is a strategy pro…le
where all players play a temporary action with probability at least equal to
" at any action phase, i.e.
P
rS2RS ¾2
S(s)(rS) ¸ " for any state s and any
player S 2N (s): An "-R Markov perfect equilibrium is an MPE in "-R
strategies.
8To see this, add a third player to the game of example 1, and suppose that a coalition
of two players obtains a payo¤ W when it exits, with W>3a;V > W +a and W>3V=4:
In this game, for ± ¸ maxf3a=W;3(V ¡ W)=Wg, there exists an equilibrium where (i)
players initially contract to form a two player coalition, (ii) after a two player coalition
is formed, all players simultaneously exit, and (iii) at the initial action phase when all
three players are present, all players remain in the game. This equilibrium results in the
formation of the ine¢cient two-player coalition.
13The class of "-R equilibria de…nes a re…nement of Markov perfect equi-
libria. This re…nement is of interest because we show in Proposition 2 that
when the discount factor is high enough, "-R equilibria always exist in games
with pure outside options. Moreover, in Proposition 3 we establish that all
"-R equilibria are Pareto e¢cient in games with pure outside options.9 Thus
"-R equilibria de…nes a non-empty class of e¢cient equilibria which is im-
mune to coordination failures.10
Proposition 2 For any underlying game v with pure outside options and
any 1 >">0; there exists ±(") such that for all ± ¸ ±("), the bargaining
game admits an "-R Markov perfect equilibrium.
Proposition 2 is a key result of our analysis. The intuition underlying the
result follows. Consider the constrained coalitional bargaining game where
all players are required to play "-R strategies. By standard arguments, this
game admits a Markov perfect equilibrium. We show that any equilibrium of
the "-constrained game is also an equilibrium of the original (unconstrained)
coalitional bargaining game. Suppose by contradiction that the constraint
were binding for one player. Exiting would then be a strict best response
at some action phase, and the game would end up with early exit with
probability at least 1¡">0: This results in an aggregate ine¢ciency for all
the players. However, if the exiting player had instead chosen to stay, her
short-term losses would be negligible (as ± is close to one), and her payo¤ in
the next period would be strictly greater than her outside option. This last
s t a t e m e n ti st r u ef o rt w or e a s o n s .O nt h eo n eh a n d ,i ft h ep l a y e rw e r en o t
chosen to propose next period, she would always be able to get her outside
option (we use here the assumption that outside options are pure, so a player
cannot be prevented from getting the same outside option next period.). On
9There may not be "-R equilibria, even for pure outside option games, for low values
of the discount factor. For example, the game analyzed in Example 1 does not admit any
"-R equilibrium for low values of ±.
10Preplay communication may be another reason for players avoiding coordination fail-
ures. Cooper et al. (1992) …nd that preplay communication can be quite e¤ective in
overcoming coordination failures
14the other hand, if the player were to propose in the next contracting phase,
she would be able to extract some of the aggregate e¢ciency loss, making
her payo¤ strictly greater than her outside option. Hence remaining in the
game must be a better response than exiting at the action phase, and any
equilibrium of the "¡constrained game is also an equilibrium of the original
game.
Note that this result depends crucially on the fact that outside options
are pure. In games where outside options depend on the actions of the other
players, a player may not be able to get the same payo¤ if she exits later
in the game. Hence, as we will see in the example below, Proposition 2
does not extend to games where players’ payo¤ upon exit depends on the
b e h a v i o ro fo t h e rp l a y e r s .
Interestingly, taking " converging to 1, Proposition 2 shows that, as ±
converges to one, the bargaining game admits a Markov perfect equilibrium
where the probability of exit at any action phase converges to zero. In fact,
this result can be strengthened, as we can show that, as ± converges to 1,
in all "-R equilibria, the probability of exit of all the players at any action
phase converges to zero. Furthermore, as the probability of remaining in the
negotiations converges to one, the grand coalition will ultimately be formed
in equilibrium, and the bargaining procedure results in an e¢cient outcome.
Proposition 3 For any game with pure outside options, as ± converges to
one, the probability of exit in any "-R Markov perfect equilibrium converges
to zero for all the players at all states, and the equilibrium outcome converges
to an e¢cient outcome (i.e., for any »>0 there exists a ±(») such that
P
©i >V¡ » for all ± ¸ ±(») ).
Propositions 2 and 3 thus show that, for games with pure outside op-
tions, as ± converges to 1, there exists a Markov perfect equilibrium resulting
in an e¢cient outcome. We now show that these results are robust to the
introduction of small external e¤ects. When outside options are approxi-
mately pure, we can still show that "-R Markov perfect equilibria exist for
high discount factors. For ± close enough to one, this guarantees that the
15game admits a Markov perfect equilibrium where players exit at the action
phase with a probability close to zero, and the outcome of the bargaining
procedure is approximately e¢cient. Formally:
Proposition 4 Let maxS;eS;a¡S;a0
¡S jv(a¡S;e S) ¡ v(a0
¡S;e S)j = ´(v): For
any 1 >">0 there exists ´(") > 0 and ±(") such that for all ± ¸ ±("),a n d
all games satisfying ´(v) · ´("),a n"-R Markov perfect equilibrium exists.
Furthermore, for any »>0 there exits ´(";») > 0 and ±(";») such that all
"-R Markov perfect equilibria result in an outcome which is approximately
Pareto e¢cient, i.e.
P
©i ¸ V ¡» for all ± ¸ ±(";») and all games satisfying
´(v) · ´(";»).
Ine¢ciencies in Games without Pure Outside Options
We now provide an example to show that when players’ outside options
depend on the behavior of other players all Markov perfect equilibria may be
ine¢cient. As all two-player games are e¢cient at the contracting stage,11
this example involves three players.
Example 2 There are three symmetric players with two actions r and e.A t









where player 1 chooses rows, player 2 chooses columns, and player 3 chooses










Thus, at the contracting phase, a proposer i always o¤er Á
2
¡i to form the grand coalition




i; and the responder accepts the o¤er.
16where player 1 ( r o w )i st h es i n g l e t o np l a y e ra n dp l a y e r2 (column) the two-
player coalition. If the grand coalition forms, the total payo¤ is V =1 0 : All
players have equal proposer probabilities and they are very patient (± close
to one):
In this example, after the exit decision of any player, the dominant strat-
egy of remaining players is to play r and they have no incentives to form any
further coalitions. Hence, as soon as one player has exited, equilibrium be-
havior is easily characterized, and we focus on those states where all players
are still present in the game. Our goal is to show that there are no e¢cient
equilibria. We prove this result in two steps, …rst analyzing the subgame
in which a two-player coalition has formed (state s2) and then the initial
contracting stage of the three-player game (state s1).
(i) Consider state s2 where a two-player coalition has formed. The action
stage admits a unique, ine¢cient, equilibrium where both players employ
mixed strategies.12 The equilibrium utilities and o¤ers are given by the

















1 =2 ¾2 ¡ (1 ¡ ¾2);
Á2
2 = ±¾1Á1
2 =9 ¾1 ¡ (1 ¡ ¾1)
This system of equations admits a unique solution (continuous in ±)w h i c h
converges to Á2
1 =0 :54 and Á2
2 =8 :42, ¾1 =0 :94,a n d¾2 =0 :51,a s±
12Clearly simultaneous exit cannot be a Nash equilibrium of the game, and there cannot
be equilibria where one player exits and the other one randomizes between staying and







2 · 10, one of the players has an incentive to take her outside option. The strategy
pro…les (e;r) and (r;e) cannot be equilibria either. For example, if player 1 exits and




2 =0 : Player 1 then has an incentive to remain, as she
would obtain either her outside option (if the other player proposes next period) or the
entire surplus V (if she proposes next period.) A similar argument shows that there is no
equilibrium where one player remains and the other one randomizes between staying and
exiting.
17converges to 1: Note that the value of the two-player coalition is Á2
2 > 8 and
that there is an e¢ciency loss as
P2
i=1 Á2
i < 9 <V =1 0 :
(ii) Now consider state s1. We …rst establish that one of the players must
have a continuation value at the action stage satisfying Á2
i(s1) > 2: Suppose
by contradiction that Á2
i(s1) · 2 for all players i. At the contracting stage,
by proposing to form a two-player coalition, a player will be able to obtain a
payo¤ Á2
2(s2)¡Á2
i(s1) > 8¡2=6 : Since every player is recognized to make
an o¤er with probability 1=3, we conclude that the continuation value at
the contracting stage of state s1;Á 1
i(s1) is bounded below by 1=3(Á2
2(s2) ¡
Á2
i(s1)) > 2: But this implies that, as ± converges to 1, in equilibrium,
all players remain at the action stage of state s. I fa tl e a s to n eo ft h e
other players exits, remaining is clearly a dominant strategy. If the two
other players remain, remaining must be a best response, because for ± close
enough to 1, ±Á1
i(s1) > 2 and the outside option has value 2.A sa l lp l a y e r s
remain at the action stage, we thus have Á2
i(s1)=±Á1
i(s1) for all players.
This last statement results in a contradiction because we assumed Á2
i(s1) · 2
and we showed Á1
i(s1) > 2:
Now, let i b eap l a y e rw i t hc o n t i n u a t i o nv a l u eÁ2
i(s1) > 2: Then, in any
equilibrium, players j and k must propose to form the two-player coalition
fj;kg at the contracting stage of state s1.T h i ss t a t e m e n tr e s u l t sf r o mt h e
fact that the marginal bene…t of including player i in the contract (V ¡
Á2
2(s2)) is smaller than the minimal transfer that player i will accept to join
the coalition, Á2
i(s1): Hence, at least in two thirds of the cases (when players
j or k are chosen to make the initial o¤er), the equilibrium of the game
results in the ine¢cient formation of a two-player coalition. This clearly
implies that the initial values of the game satisfy
P
©i <V :
Example 2 is clearly robust to small perturbations in the payo¤ matri-
ces. Furthermore, in the next Section, we provide an economic application
(market entry with synergies) giving rise to a payo¤ structure which is equiv-
alent to the payo¤ structure of Example 2. In the absence of a complete
characterization of games resulting in ine¢cient outcomes, we note that the
18example displays two crucial properties:
(i) there exists an action stage where in equilibrium, the probability of
exit of all players is bounded away from zero (for all ± ¸ ¹ ±);
(ii) at the initial contracting stage, players have an incentive to reach the
action stage where exit occurs with positive probability.
Property (i) highlights the di¤erence between the case of pure outside
options (where there always exist an equilibrium with all players remaining
for ± close to 1) and general games. In our example, the outside option of
a player crucially depends on the behavior of the other player. By exiting
alone, both players obtain positive payo¤s (of 2 or 9), but the outside options
become negative when both players exit simultaneously. Hence, a player may
choose to exit today, because by waiting one period, she might be unable to
retain the same outside option. In games with two players and two actions,
it can be checked that the structure of our example (a ”game of chicken”
where (e;e) gives lower payo¤s than (r;r), and the sum of the maximal
outside options of the two players is greater than V ) is the only structure
for which all equilibria are ine¢cient.
Property (ii) can only be satis…ed if the payo¤ of a two-player coalition
is large with respect to the value of the grand coalition. A rapid look at
the equations de…ning equilibrium at the action stage shows that the most
favorable condition for Á2
2 to be high is when the outside option of the two-
player coalition is high and the outside option of the singleton is low. (In our
example, the outside option of the two player coalition (9) is much higher
than the outside option of the singleton player (2)). In other words, the
f o r m a t i o no fat w o - p l a y e rc o a l i t i o nm u s tr e s u l ti nal a r g ei n c r e a s ei nt h e
v a l u eo ft h eo u t s i d eo p t i o n .
5A p p l i c a t i o n s
In this Section, we develop four applications of the model to economic prob-
lems. We study the Markov perfect equilibria of the bargaining game, and
19we analyze the distribution of the surplus induced by the equilibria and the
dynamics of coalition formation.
5.1 Multilateral Bargaining with Outside Options
Bilateral bargaining with outside options is a problem that has been widely
studied (e.g., Shaked and Sutton (1984) and Sutton (1986)) and has been
applied to a variety of economic problems (labor negotiations, marriage,
contract theory, etc.). Yet little is know about its natural extension to an
a r b i t r a r yn u m b e ro fp l a y e r s .W ed e v e l o pt h i se x t e n s i o ni nt h i ss e c t i o na n d
show that the equilibrium exhibits some novel properties.
In the multilateral bargaining game with outside options there are n
players who can collectively achieve a surplus V when the grand coalition
forms. Each player is characterized by an outside option vi.At the action
stage each player can choose between remaining or exiting. If a player S
exits, her outside option is given by
P
i2S vi: In the Appendix, we obtain
the following closed form solution for the "-R Markov perfect equilibrium as
± converges to one.
Proposition 5 The multilateral bargaining with outside options has the fol-
lowing Markov perfect equilibrium outcome:
(i) If v ¸ 1
nv,w h e r ev =m a x i=1;:::;n vi is the largest outside option, the
equilibrium payo¤s converge to:
Ái = vi +
(v ¡ vi)
Pn








for all i 2 N and only the player with largest outside option opts out; the












nv the equilibrium payo¤s converge to Ái = 1
nv; for all i 2 N and
no player opts out at the action stage.
20This equilibrium is a generalization of the equilibrium of Example 1,
when players remain in the game with positive probability. It re‡ects the
“outside options principle”: either outside options are binding and the player
with the largest outside option receives her outside option, or they are not
binding and the outcome of bargaining is una¤ected by the outside options
(see Sutton (1986)).
However, the equilibrium exhibits a novel property. The equilibrium
payo¤ of all the players depend on the entire vector of outside options, in-
cluding the smallest outside options. This result can easily be interpreted. In
equilibrium, the player with the largest outside option randomizes between
exiting and staying. Hence, if a player rejects the o¤er at the contracting
stage, every player will obtain her outside option with positive probability.
The equilibrium o¤er to any player i is thus a function of the entire vector
of outside options, and is increasing in vi:
The model puts forward testable empirical predictions that could be
explored in experimental studies. The model has other comparative statics
implications (besides the one that player’s payo¤ are increasing on their
outside option). It also predicts that an increase in the highest outside
option increases the sensitivity of a player’s payo¤ with respect to her own
outside option,
@2Ái
@v@vi ¸ 0. Increasing the largest outside option v; increases
the probability of opting out, and the bargaining outcome becomes more
sensitive to the outside options of all the players.
5.2 Contracting with Externalities
Segal (1999) analyzes a contracting model with externalities, in which a
principal contracts with several agents. Players’ utilities depend on the
trades (actions) chosen by the principal and the agents he has contracted
with, so that agents excluded from the contract may su¤er (or bene…t from)
externalities. Segal (1999) shows that this general structure encompasses a
number of speci…c models, ranging from models in industrial organization
(vertical contracting, exclusive dealing, network externalities, mergers to
monopoly), to models in …nance (debt restructuring, takeovers) or public
21economics (the provision of public goods and bads). Our goal here is to
analyze this principal-agent problem in a dynamic setting (Segal’s (1999)
model is static) and explore the role of outside options, or irreversibility of
trades, in the allocation of gains and the e¢ciency of the outcome.
Speci…cally, trade among the principal and agent i is described by the
action ai 2 [0;a], where i =1 ;:::;n: Externalities among agent’s actions are
captured by the following utility structure. Any agent i trading with the
principal receives a payo¤ ai®(A)+¯ (A); where A denotes aggregate trade,
A =
Pn
i=1 ai. If an agent does not trade with the principal, she chooses the
no-trade action ai =0 ; and obtains a payo¤ ¯ (A). The principal’s payo¤ is
given by F(A).13 Without loss of generality, all players no-trade payo¤s are
normalized to zero (i.e., F(0) = ¯ (0) = 0).
Principal agent models can be divided into two broad categories, accord-
ing to the sign of the externalities that traders impose on nontraders.
De…nition 3 Externalities on nontraders are positive (negative) if their
payo¤ ¯ (A) is increasing (decreasing) in the aggregate trade A =
P
ai:
A dynamic version of the principal agent problem can be recast in the
framework of this paper as follows. In any period of the game, at the con-
tracting stage, the principal contracts with a coalition of agents S (like Segal
(1999), we assume that agents cannot contract among themselves and that
the principal has all the bargaining power). At the action stage, the princi-
pal and the agents who have already contracted, say S; may choose not to
trade (a reversible action) or to trade (a permanent action). When coalition
S trades (or exits) it chooses the trade AS that maximizes its payo¤, i.e.
v(S)=m a x A F(A)+A®(A)+jSj¯ (A); the payo¤ received by agents outside
coalition S when there is exit is thus vi (S)=¯ (AS):
Interestingly, despite the existence of externalities, the underlying game
is a pure outside option game because the aggregate payo¤ of principal and
13When agents are identical, this utility speci…cation is equivalent to the linearity con-
dition (condition L) proposed by Segal (1999, p. 341). Segal (1999) shows that this
condition is satis…ed in a variety of economic models.
22agents who are contracting, v(S); does not depend on actions of other no-
trading agents. We now characterize a Markov perfect equilibrium for ±
converging to one. When externalities on nontraders are positive, it is easy
to see that the multilateral bargaining procedure immediately reaches an
e¢cient agreement. By o¤ering to form the grand coalition, and o¤ering
to each agent his minimal payo¤ (the no-trade value), the principal can
extract the entire surplus. As the principal has all the bargaining power and
agents’ outside options are minimized with no trade, these o¤ers constitute
a subgame perfect equilibrium.14
When externalities on nontraders are negative, the structure of equilib-




where the …rst inequality is due to the fact that AS is the optimal trade of
a coalition S, and the second inequality is due to the fact that externalities
a r en e g a t i v e( b e c a u s e¯(0) = 0;¯(AT) · 0).15 Hence, when externalities
are negative, the principal obtains a higher payo¤ in a subcoalition S than
in the grand coalition and her exit option v(S) is greater than the total
surplus V .
Therefore, after a coalition S is formed, it will require a positive transfer
from all remaining agents to form the grand coalition. The coalition receives
a transfer
v(S)¡V
jNj¡jSj per agent.16 Note that this transfer is an average of what
the remaining agents get if the coalition trades, vi(S); and what they get if
the coalition does not trade, 0 (the weights depend on the probabilities that
the coalition chooses to exit or stay at the action stage).
14Segal (1999, p. 368) also notes that in games with positive externalities, e¢cient
outcomes can easily be reached by having the principal make an o¤er conditional on
unanimous acceptance.
15The normalization, ¯ (0) = 0, implies that in games with positive (negative) external-
ities ¯ (A) > 0 (¯ (A) < 0), whenever A>0:
16The transfer made by each agent is the solution of v(S)+x(jNj¡j Sj)=V:
23The coalition that forms in the …rst step is the one that can extract the
highest transfer from agents after formed,





In the Appendix, we construct a Markov perfect equilibrium where the prin-
cipal is able to extract a transfer v¤ from all agents, and the grand coalition
is formed in two steps. Summarizing our …ndings we have:
Proposition 6 The principal agent problem has the following e¢cient Markov
perfect equilibrium outcome:
(i) Positive externalities: the principal o¤ers to form the grand coalition of-
fering to each agent his minimal payo¤ (the no-trade value); all agents get
the no-trade value and the principal extracts the entire surplus;
(ii) Negative externalities: the principal proposes to form a random coalition
that maximizes
v(S)¡V
jNj¡jSj,a s k i n gv¤ for each agent receiving the o¤er. Then,
the principal forms the grand coalition with the remaining agents, also ask-
ing v¤ per agent, and when at the action stage exits the game with a positive
probability, converging to 0 as ± converges to one:
Hence, when externalities are negative, the principal has an incentive
to contract with the agents in two steps. In the …rst step, the principal
forms a coalition which generates maximum negative external e¤ects on the
remaining players. In the second step, the principal uses his credible outside
option to extract high transfers from the agents (see also Genicot and Ray
(2003)).17 On the other hand, in the positive externality case, contracting
takes place in only one step.
5.3 Public Good Provision (Ray and Vohra, 2001)
Ray and Vohra (2001) analyze the formation of coalitions providing a pure
public good. The leading illustration of their model is the formation of
17Genicot and Ray (2003) also consider the contracting problem among the principal
and several agents (the negative externality case) using a di¤erent dynamic framework
than ours. They also …nd that contracting will occur in several steps.
24groups of countries deciding on abatement levels in international negotia-
tions over transboundary pollution. They assume that each agent has a
utility given by v = Z ¡ c(z); where Z is the total amount of public goods
provided and z the quantity produced by the agent, with c(:) strictly in-
creasing, strictly convex and c0(0) = 0: When a coalition S exits, it chooses





We restrict our analysis to a symmetric three-player game. Suppose that
every player only has access to two strategies: remaining (r), resulting in a
zero contribution to the public good, and exiting (e) where she contributes
her optimal level of public good. As c0(0) = 0, every coalition will ultimately
choose to exit and provide the public good. Hence, as ± converges to 1,t h e
only relevant payo¤s are the payo¤s obtained by the three players when
they exit as singletons (denoted a), the payo¤s obtained when a two-player
coalition and a singleton exit (denoted b for the two-player coalition and c
for the singleton), and the total payo¤ V obtained by the grand coalition
when it exits. Furthermore, as the optimal level of public good for coalition
S is independent of the choices of the other players, and the cost function
c is strictly convex, the game is strictly superadditive, i.e. b>2a and
V> b + c:
It is easy to check that the "-R equilibria of this game result in the for-
mation of the grand coalition. Once a two-player coalition has formed, the
game becomes equivalent to an asymmetric version of Example 1, and in
an "-R equilibrium either both players remain in the game (and obtain V=2
each), or the large player randomizes between exiting and staying, and ob-
tains her outside option b (when b ¸ V=2). Hence, either the grand coalition
is formed immediately, or a two-player coalition forms, and negotiates with
the remaining player to form the grand coalition. One can check that it is
optimal to form the grand coalition immediately when the outside value of
a partial coalition b is not too high; if this outside option is high, the grand
coalition is formed in two steps, and members of the two-player coalition ob-
25tain their outside option b. Formally, we obtain the following Proposition:
Proposition 7 In the three player public good application, there exists a
unique "-R Markov perfect equilibrium, as ± converges to 1. This equilibrium
give rise to the formation of the grand coalition. If b · 2V=3,t h eg r a n d
coalition is formed immediately; if b>2V=3, the grand coalition is formed
in two steps.
It is instructive to contrast the result of Proposition 7 with the analysis of
Ray and Vohra (2001), who use a di¤erent model of coalitional bargaining.
In Ray and Vohra (2001)’s model, players make o¤ers to form coalitions
according to a …xed protocol. As coalitions exit the game immediately after
they are formed, exit decisions are taken sequentially. In this model, it
is easy to see that the procedure may end up in an ine¢cient equilibrium,
where some players decide to leave early, in order to free-ride on the coalition
formed by subsequent players. (More precisely, the …rst player may choose
to exit, anticipating that the next two players form a coalition; this early
exit decision is optimal whenever c>V= 3). In our model, by contrast, exit
decisions are taken simultaneously. If a player makes an unacceptable o¤er
at the initial stage (or rejects the o¤er), all players simultaneously choose
whether to exit at the action phase, resulting in a value less than V=3: Hence,
players cannot commit to exit and free-ride on the coalitions formed by other
players, and the equilibrium outcome is e¢cient. Finally, the dynamics of
coalition formation reported in Proposition 7 is reminiscent of Seidmann
and Winter (1998)’s results in games without externalities. Seidmann and
Winter (1998) show that non-emptiness of the core is a necessary condition
for the grand coalition to form immediately. If we interpret b as the value
of a two-player coalition, non-emptiness of the core is equivalent to b ·
2V=3. Hence, as in Seidmann and Winter (1998), but within a di¤erent
model of coalitional bargaining, we observe that the grand coalition forms
immediately when the worth of intermediate coalitions is small, and form
gradually when the worth of intermediate coalitions becomes large.
265.4 Market Entry with Synergies
Suppose that three symmetric …rms contemplate entering a market with
…xed entry costs. By making a prior agreement, …rms can bene…t from
synergies which will reduce their entry cost. Individual …rms face an entry
cost F,ac o a l i t i o no ft w o… r m sf a c e sa ne n t r yc o s tG,w i t hG<Fand the
e n t r yc o s to ft h ec o a l i t i o no ft h r e e… r m si sn o r m a l i z e dt oz e r o . I fas i n g l e
…rm enters the market, it obtains a gross monopoly pro…t 1 >F;i ft w oo r
three …rms enter the market simultaneously, price competition drives pro…ts
down to zero for all the …rms which have entered the market. Obviously,
the Pareto e¢cient outcome is for the grand coalition to form and enter the
market.
We analyze this model by assuming that coalitions choose between two
strategies remaining in the game (r) and exiting and entering the market
(e). Clearly, once one …rm has entered the market, the other …rms should
abstain from entering. Hence, as ± converges to 1, the payo¤ matrices of the
game ¡ played at the action phases converge to:
re
r (Á;Á;Á) (0;1 ¡ F;0)
e (1 ¡ F;0;0) (¡F;¡F;0)
re
r (0;0;1 ¡ F) (0;¡F;¡F)
e (¡F;0;¡F) (¡F;¡F;¡F)
re
where player 1 chooses rows, player 2 chooses columns, and player 3 chooses
matrices, and Á denotes the continuation value of the game at the initial
contracting phase.
If two players form a coalition, the payo¤ matrices are given by
re
r (Á1;Á 2) (0;1 ¡ G)
e (1 ¡ F;0) (¡F;¡G)
where player 1 is the singleton player and player 2 the two-player coalition
and Á1 and Á2 denote the continuation value at the contracting phase of the
two players.
27As long as 1 >F+ G, it is easy to see that the two-player game played
after a two-player coalition has formed is equivalent to the two-player game
of Example 2, and the only equilibrium at the action phase involves both
players employing completely mixed strategies. Now assume that there is
a large di¤erent between the …xed costs of single …rms and of coalitions of
two …rms (F>4=5 and G<1=5). In that case, the three-player symmetric
game becomes equivalent to the game of Example 2. In the Appendix,
we show that the Markov perfect equilibrium of the game results in the
ine¢cient formation of a two-player coalition, which exits the game with
positive probability at the action phase.
Proposition 8 In the three-player model of market entry with synergies,
as ± converges to 1, the Markov perfect equilibria of the game lead to the
formation of a two-player coalition in the initial contracting stage, and …rms
ine¢ciently exit the game with positive probability at the action phase.
Proposition 8 shows that ine¢cient outcomes arise not only in numerical
examples, but also in signi…cant economic models. Ine¢ciencies may also
obtain in a larger class of models in Industrial Organization where …rms
decide whether to invest in a project and bene…t from synergies by forming
coalitions. A typical example of those situations are research joint ventures
(RJV) which have been analyzed, among others, by Kamien et al. (1992)
and d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988). If spillovers in R&D are low, R&D
decisions are strategic substitutes and partial RJVs create signi…cant value
because they impose negative externalities on non-participants. Our results
suggest that these two ingredients combined may lead to the formation of
ine¢cient partial RJVs. On the other hand, if there are signi…cant R&D
spillovers then R&D decisions are strategic complements, and we expect the
formation of a comprehensive RJV.
286C o n c l u s i o n
This paper proposes a coalitional bargaining model in which coalitions strate-
gically interact and endogenously choose whether or not to exit. This for-
mulation is general enough to study the formation of coalitions and the
distribution of gains from cooperation in a wide variety of economic models
with externalities and outside options. We show that when outside options
are independent of the actions of other players, there exists Markov perfect
equilibria (the class of MPE without coordination failures) which converge
to e¢cient outcomes when the players become perfectly patient. On the
other hand, in games with general outside options, all equilibria may be
ine¢cient.
These results highlight the di¤erence between our model and previous
models of coalitional bargaining. In a setting with externalities, Ray and
Vohra (1999) show that when players cannot renegotiate, the outcome of
coalition formation is typically ine¢cient, as players have an incentive to
leave the game before extracting all the surplus. On the contrary, Gomes
(2001) establishes that when renegotiation occurs and players cannot choose
to exit, the outcome is always e¢cient. Our study identi…es a new type of
friction – externalities on players’ endogenous outside options – that may
lead to bargaining ine¢ciencies.
29Appendix: Proofs
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 : We de…ne a correspondence F :© £©£§1£§2 !!
©£©£§1£§2 w h o s e… x e dp o i n t sa r et h eM P E .© is the set of continuation values
Á =( ÁS(s)), which are bounded below by
minfvS(a):for all states s s.t. S 2C (s) and a 2 (AT)T2C(s)g;
where C(s)=N(s) [E(s): Furthermore, the sum
X
S2C(s)
ÁS(s) is bounded above
by V so © is a closed, convex interval of a …nite-dimensional Euclidean space. Let
§1 be the set of proposers’ strategies ¾1 at the contracting stage. Omitting the
transfers (which are de…ned as the value of the coalition at the next action phase),
¾1
S(s) is a probability distribution over the …nite set fS ½ N(s): S 2Sg .L e t§2
be the set of strategies ¾2 at the action stage. For any state s and any coalition
S 2N(s), ¾2
S(s) is a probability distribution over the …nite set AS: Both §1 and
§2 are thus convex and compact subsets of a …nite-dimensional Euclidean space.
The correspondence F is de…ned as follows. ('1;' 2;¹ 1;¹ 2) 2 F(Á
1;Á
2;¾1;¾2)















































































S(h(s;a)) + (1 ¡ ±)vS(a;e(s))
¢
:
According to Proposition 1, the …xed points of F are MPE. To show that F has
a …xed point we apply the Kakutani …xed point theorem. We have already noted
that Z =©£ © £ §1 £ §2 is a compact and convex subset of a …nite-dimensional
Euclidean space, and F (Z) ½ Z: Furthermore, standard arguments show that F (z)
is a convex (and non-empty) set for all z 2 Z,a n dt h a tF has a closed graph. Thus
the Kakutani …xed point theorem applies. Q.E.D.
30Proof of Proposition 2: Suppose by contradiction that there exists an
MPE of the constrained game, ¾k; with payo¤s Á
k; and a sequence ±
k converging
to one, such that ¾k is not an MPE of the original, game. Let s be a state where











S (s)(aS)=".L e tK be the minimum aggregate e¢ciency loss
when one coalition opts out. By assumption, K>0. Since coalition S opts out with




for all future action pro…les ak;Á
2;k
N (s) · V ¡ (1 ¡ ")K. (We denote the sum P
S2C(s) vS (a) by vN (a)).
We now estimate the lowest payo¤ that coalition S c a no b t a i ni nt h e"¡constrained
game. She can guarantee for herself at least vS by opting out, but in the "¡constrained
game she can only opt with probability at most equal to 1 ¡ ": The strategy
of opting out of the game with probability 1 ¡ ",a n dc h o o s i n gxS such that
vS =m i n xS2RS minx¡S2X¡S vS(xS;x ¡S) with probability " at every action stage;
and of not making any o¤ers and rejecting any o¤ers made at every contracting
stage, yields coalition S at least
Á
S =
vS (1 ¡ ±)+±(1¡ ")vS
1 ¡ ±"
;








S (s) ¸ Á






























S (s) ¸ Á
S+qS(s)(1¡ ")K: But coalition S’s payo¤ uk
S(s;aS;¾2
¡S);










S +( 1¡ ±)vS
´
; (3)
where ¸ ¸ "N(s)¡1 is the probability that all remaining N(s)nS coalitions choose





¡S) ¸ ¸(vS + qS(s)(1¡ ")K)+( 1¡ ¸)vS)
= vS + ¸ ¢ qS(s)(1¡ ")K>v S
31which is in contradiction with inequality (1). Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 : We prove that as ± converges to one, all "-R
MPE converge to a Pareto e¢cient outcome. Assume by contradiction that there
is a state s for which the statement is false. (In case there are multiple states for
which the statement is false, choose one with the smallest number of active players).
Then there is a subsequence ±k converging to one satisfying Á
2;k
N (s) · V ¡K; where
K>0: The payo¤ of any player S 2N(s) also satis…es inequality (2) thus Á
1;k
S (s) ¸
vS + qS(s)K>v S: Since player S’ sp a y o ¤f r o mr e m a i n i n gi nt h eg a m ei sg r e a t e r
than expression (3), for k large enough, it is greater than vS + ¸ ¢ qS(s)K>v S.





Consider the players’ strategies at the contracting stage of state s: Forming the
grand coalition yields a strictly positive gain V ¡Á
2;k
N (s) ¸ K>0: But then in all
states g(c;s); there are fewer active players than in state s, and thus by our initial
assumption, Á
2;k




















N (s) ! V , resulting in a contradiction. It is clear
that if the probability of early exit did not converge to zero, then the MPE could
not converge to the Pareto e¢cient outcome. Moreover, since the probability of
early exit converges to zero, then the equilibrium payo¤s at both stages converge
to the same value. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 : The structure of the proof is similar to the
structure of the proofs of Proposition 2 and Proposition 3 and we only outline the
steps that are di¤erent.
For all S; there exist vS such that maxeS;a¡S jvS(eS;a ¡S)¡vSj·´=2: Inequality
(1) changes to





¡S) for all aS 2 RS: (4)
The same argument as in the proof of Proposition 2 shows that Á





S (s) ¸ vS ¡ ´=2+qS(s)(1¡ ")K;
and coalition S’s payo¤ uk
S(s;aS;¾2
¡S); is at least equal to
¸(vS ¡ ´=2+qS(s)(1¡ ")K)+( 1¡ ¸)(vS ¡ ´=2):





¡S) ¸ vS ¡ ´=2+¸ ¢ qS(s)(1¡ ")K;
32which is greater than vS + ´=2 for ´ small enough, resulting in a contradiction.
To show that the equilibrium is approximately e¢cient, an adaptation of the
proof of Proposition 3 shows that equilibrium payo¤s satisfy Á
1;k
S (s) ¸ vS ¡ 1
2´ +
qS(s)K>v S + 1
2´ for k large enough and ´ small enough. Hence, at the action
phase, no player wants to opt out, and at the contracting phase, all players want to
form some coalition. This implies that the equilibrium is approximately e¢cient.
Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 : We construct the equilibrium. At any state s
where some players have opted out, the equilibrium strategy is for all active players
to opt out. At any state s where no player has opted out, let S1;:::;Sm be the m
active coalitions (indexed by j), and let S1 be the coalition with the highest outside
option (and suppose that there is a single coalition with the highest outside option).
We propose the following strategies. At the contracting stage, every player
proposes to form the grand coalition, and to o¤er xj to other coalitions, resulting
in expected equilibrium payo¤s Áj. At the action stage, player S1 opts out of the
game with probability ¾ and the other players continue to negotiate. Let vN =§ ivi:
The variables ¾(s);x i(s) and Ái(s) are de…ned by the following equations :
If v1 ¸ 1
mV then
¾(s)=( 1 ¡ ±)
mv1 ¡ ±V










´ and xj(s)=Áj(s) ¡
(1 ¡ ±)v1
±














±V for i =1 ;:::;m: (6)
We now show that this strategy pro…le forms a Markov perfect equilibrium. Con-
sider any state where all players are active. If v1 ¸ 1
mV , at the action stage,
player 1 is indi¤erent between opting out and continuing, as v1 = ±Á1: For players
j =2 ;:::;m;
±Áj ¡ vj =






For ± close enough to 1, ±Áj ¡ vj > 0, so no player wants to opt out. If now
v1 < 1
mV; for all players j =1 ;2;:::;m; ±Áj ¡ vj = ±V
m ¡ vj > 0 for ± large enough.
So no player wants to opt out either.
33Consider now the contracting stage. First suppose that v1 ¸ 1
mV . If the grand
coalition is formed, the o¤ers must satisfy





x1 = v1 = ±Á1;
Combining the last two equations,








xi = Ái ¡
(1 ¡ ±)v1
±
for i =1 ;:::;m;




=( 1¡ ¾)±Áj + ¾±vj;
whose unique solution is the Áj given in the proposed strategy pro…le. Adding all
equations for j =2 ;:::;n results in
xN ¡ x1 =( 1¡ ¾)(±ÁN ¡ ±Á1)+¾±(vN ¡ v1);
and since ÁN = V , xN = ÁN ¡m
(1¡±)v1
± ;± Á 1 = v1; and x1 = v1 we can solve for ¾,
¾ =( 1¡ ±)
mv1 ¡ ±V
±(±V ¡ ±vN ¡ v1 (1 ¡ ±))
;
as claimed. Notice that ¾ ¸ 0 if and only if ± ¸ ±0 where ±0 = v1
V ¡vN+v1 < 1
because V ¡ vN > 0; and for ± close enough to 1, ¾ · 1.
Now suppose that v1 < 1
mV: If the grand coalition is formed,





and it is straightforward to verify that the unique solution of the system of equations
is given by the formula in the description of the strategy pro…le.
It remains to verify that no player wants to deviate by forming a subcoalition
at the contracting stage. Consider a deviation by which some of the active players
form a subcoalition S ½ N; and let Á
0
j be the continuation value of players following
the deviation. If vS ¸ v1 then the payo¤ of coalition S converges to Á
0
S = vS for
± large enough. Now vS <Á S since Ái ¸ vi with strict inequality for at least one
i 2 S: Hence, the deviation is not pro…table. Similarly, if vS <v 1 ,a l lp l a y e r s
34j= 2 S [f 1g bene…t from the deviation, since their new payo¤ Á
0
j is obtained by
replacing m by m¡jSj+1in the formula for equilibrium payo¤s, and thus satisfy
Á
0






j2N Áj = V and Á
0
1 = Á1, players in S are better
o¤ not deviating.
Our analysis only deals with the case where there is a unique player with the
highest outside value at any state. The result can be generalized to situations with
multiple players with highest values as follows. Suppose that there are m players,
j =1 ;:::;m; such that vj =m a x i2N vi. Perturb the payo¤s, by adding a random
vector " to all the payo¤s, and construct the equilibrium for the perturbed game,
where all values are di¤erent. As " goes to zero, because equilibrium payo¤s and
strategies are upper hemi continuous in the parameters of the game, one can obtain
limit equilibrium payo¤s and strategies for the original game. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6: We give an explicit construction of the Markov
perfect equilibrium. Consider any state s where the principal has contracted with a
set S of agents. Due to the symmetry of the problem we associate to each coalition
S its cardinal, #S = m; and de…ne v(m), vi(m);Á
k(m) and Á
k
i (m): Let x¤(m) be
the unique solution of














Consider the following strategies. At a subgame m where x¤(m)=m, the principal
o¤ers Á
2
i(m) to all the remaining agents, and the agents accept any o¤er greater
than or equal to Á
2
i(m). At the action stage, the principal exits with a positive
probability ¾.T h ev a l u e s¾ and Á
2
i(m) are computed as solutions to the equations:
Á













i(m)=( 1 ¡ ¾)±Á
1
i(m)+¾vi(m)
At a subgame m where x¤(m) >m , the principal o¤ers to contract with x¤(m)¡
m of the n¡m remaining agents (all agents are chosen with equal probability). She
o¤ers Á
2
i(m) to all the agents, and agents accept any o¤er greater than or equal to
Á
2
i(m): At the action stage, the principal never exits. The value Á
2
i(m) is computed
35as a solution to the equations:
Á
1(m)=Á






























i (m) and ¾
(1¡±) converges to the positive value
v(m)¡v(n)
v(n)¡v(m)¡(n¡m)vi(m):
To show that this strategy pro…le forms a subgame perfect equilibrium, we …rst
consider subgames satisfying x¤(m)=m. By construction, the principal’s exit
decision at the action stage and the agents’ responses at the contracting stage are
optimal. It remains to check that the principal’s o¤er at the contracting stage is
optimal. Suppose by contradiction that the principal makes an acceptable o¤er to
m0 <nagents. She would then receive a payo¤ Á
2(m0) ¡ (m0 ¡ m)Á
2
i(m) instead
of v(n) ¡ (n ¡ m)Á
2
i(m): Two cases must be distinguished. If x¤(m0)=m0; then
Á





n ¡ m0 ;
and hence
v(m0) <v (n) ¡ (n ¡ m0)Á
2
i(m);
establishing that the deviation is unpro…table. If now x¤(m0) >m 0, in the con-
tinuation game, the principal proposes to form a coalition of size x¤(m0) and then
moves to the grand coalition. Overall, she thus o¤ers v¤
i (m0) to the remaining
(n ¡ m0) agents and Á
2(m0)=v(n) ¡ (n ¡ m0)v¤
i (m0). But because x¤(m)=m;
v¤
i (m0) >v ¤
i (m) and hence,
v(n) ¡ (n ¡ m0)v¤
i (m0) ¡ (m0 ¡ m)v¤
i (m) <v(n) ¡ (n ¡ m)v¤
i (m);
establishing that the deviation is unpro…table.
Consider now a subgame satisfying x¤(m) >m . We …rst show that, at the
action stage, staying in the game is the optimal action of the principal. By exiting,
the principal obtains a payo¤ of v(m) and by staying a payo¤ of Á(m)=v (n) ¡
(n ¡ m)v¤






so that the optimal strategy is to choose a temporary action. At the contracting
stage, the agents’ response is optimal by construction, and by an argument similar
to the argument in the case x¤(m)=m; the principal has no incentive to o¤er to
36form a coalition of size m0 6= x¤(m): Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n7 : We construct the payo¤ matrices of the game
¡ played at the action phases when ± converges to 1: It is easy to check that, once
a player has exited the game, the optimal choice of the two remaining players is
to exit as a two-player coalition, and the expected payo¤ of each of the remaining








where Á denotes the continuation value of the game at the initial contracting phase.
If two players form a coalition, the payo¤ matrices are given by
r e
r (Á1;Á 2) (c;b)
e (c;b) (c;b)
where player 1 is the singleton player and player 2 the two-player coalition and Á1
and Á2 denote the continuation value at the contracting phase of the two players.
Once the two-player coalition has formed, the two-player game corresponds to
an asymmetric version of Example 1, and as V> c +b, we can easily characterize the
"-R equilibria for ± converging to 1: If V=2 > maxfc;bg; the game admits a unique
"-R equilibrium where both players remain and Á1 = Á2 = V=2: If V=2 · maxfc;bg,
the game admits a unique "-R equilibrium where the player with the largest option
randomizes between staying and exiting, and the player with the lowest outside
option remains in the game. The probability that the player with the largest option
remains in the game converges to 1 as ± converges to 1. Supposing (without loss of
generality) that c ¸ b, the payo¤s converge to Á1 = c;Á2 = V ¡ c>b :
We now consider the symmetric "-R equilibria of the game at the initial phase,
w h e r et h et h r e ep l a y e r sa r es i n g l e t o n s .C o n s i d e r… r s tt h ea c t i o ns t a g e .I fV=3 >c ,
there exists an equilibrium where all players remain and Á = V=3.I fV=3 <c ,t h e
symmetric "-R equilibrium involves all players choosing a common probability ¾ of
remaining in the game, where ¾ satis…es:
¾2V=3+¾(1 ¡ ¾)b = ¾2c +2 ¾(1 ¡ ¾)a:
Notice that, in both cases, the continuation value of players at the action stage
satisfy Á
2 · V=3:
Now, consider the initial contracting stage. Suppose …rst that b · 2V=3.I n
that case, we claim that the grand coalition is formed immediately. By forming
a two player coalition, the proposer gets at most: b ¡ Á
2 whereas she would get
V ¡ 2Á
2 if she proposed to form the grand coalition immediately. As b · 2V=3
37and Á
2 · V=3;b¡ x · V ¡ 2x.I f n o w b>2V=3, we claim that the coalition
is formed in two steps. As b>2V=3;c < V=3 and hence Á
2 = V=3.B u t t h e n ,
V ¡ 2Á
2 = V=3 <b¡ Á
2, and at the initial contracting stage, the proposer has an
incentive to form a two-player coalition. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n8 : Consider the action stage after two players
have formed a coalition. The only equilibrium of the game is a completely mixed
strategy pro…le (¾1;¾2) satisfying the following equations (the notations are similar
to those of Example 2),
x1 =( 1 ¡ ¾2)Á1 =( 1¡ ¾2) ¡ F;








(1 ¡ x1 + x2):
Solving these equations we obtain:
Á1 =1¡ t; Á2 = t
¾1 =
(t¡F)(1¡t)








where t is a solution of f(t)=2 t3 +( ¡3 ¡ F + G)t2 +( 2 F +1 )t ¡ F =0 : Note
that because F + G<1,
f(F)=¡F2 (1 ¡ G ¡ F) < 0 and f(1 ¡ G)=G2 (1 ¡ G ¡ F) > 0;
so that a solution t 2 (F;1 ¡ G) exists.
Now consider the initial stage where no coalition has been formed. We will
show that it is a weakly dominant strategy for every …rm to stay. By staying, a
…rm obtains either ±Á if no other …rm exits, or 0 if another …rm exits. By exiting,
the …rm either gets 1 ¡ F if no other …rm enters the market, or 0 otherwise. We
want to show:
±Á ¸ 1 ¡ F: (10)
We consider only symmetric equilibria. If players propose to form the grand coali-
tion at the contracting stage, Á =1 =3 and, as ± converges to 1 and F>4=5;±Á¸
1 ¡ F: If players propose to form a two-player coalition with equal probability of
choosing any of the two other …rms, and with x the continuation value at the action














The solution (9) implies that inequality (10) is equivalent to
h(t)=2 F + Ft+2 t2 ¡ 4t ¸ 0:
38This inequality holds for all F ¸ 4=5 because the quadratic expression h(:) satis…es
h(F)=F(3F ¡ 2) > 0 and h0(F)=5 F ¡ 4 ¸ 0:
Finally, we check that it is an optimal strategy for a …rm to form a coalition
with one of the two other …rms at the initial contracting stage. By forming the
grand coalition, each …rm obtains a payo¤ 1¡2±Á: By forming a coalition of size 2
it obtains x2 ¡ ±Á: Hence, we need to establish that
x2 + Á ¸ 1;
which is equivalent to g(t)=8 t2¡(5F +7 )t+5F ¸ 0: This inequality holds for all
F 2 (2=3;1) because the quadratic expression g(:) satis…es g(F)=F (3F ¡ 2) > 0
and g0(F)=F (16 ¡ 5F) > 0: Q.E.D.
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